THREE ESSAYS ON INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION GAMES by Sung, Yeol Yong
THREE ESSAYS ON INFORMATION
TRANSMISSION IN ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION GAMES
by
Yeol Yong Sung
BA in Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, 1999
MA in Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, 2004
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
the Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
University of Pittsburgh
2010
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
ARTS AND SCIENCES
This dissertation was presented
by
Yeol Yong Sung
It was defended on
July 19, 2010
and approved by
Andreas Blume, Professor, Department of Economics
James Cassing, Professor, Department of Economics
John Duffy, Professor, Department of Economics
Esther Gal-Or, Professor, Katz School of Business
Dissertation Director: Andreas Blume, Professor, Department of Economics
ii
Copyright c© by Yeol Yong Sung
2010
iii
THREE ESSAYS ON INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION GAMES
Yeol Yong Sung, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2010
This dissertation consists of three chapters where we study information transmission in
various environments.
The first chapter analyzes the effect of the presence of an uninformed sender on the infor-
mation transmission between an informed sender and the receiver. The sender is uninformed
with a positive probability and it is not verifiable whether she is informed or not. In almost
all equilibria, the uninformed sender pools with a subset of types of the informed sender.
We show that there exists an equilibrium in which the informed sender’s cheap talk message
conveys more precise information and the informed sender is better off by the presence of
the uninformed sender.
In the second chapter, a buyer is uncertain of information on product qualities. We
introduce a variable that generates social value of information, which is buyer’s action such
as the usage and maintenance of a product after purchase. If the buyer is concerned about
his action, the seller has more incentive to reveal product information. Furthermore, more
information is revealed as the variance of the quality is larger or as the average quality is
lower. In this model, the certification cost is increasing in the sense that a better certificate
is more costly. Then, there are multiple equilibria and the least level of revelation is ex ante
Pareto optimal.
In the third chapter, we study firms’ voluntary disclosure in an oligopoly market for dif-
ferentiated products in which firms are allowed to advertise a rival’s product as well as their
own product. We show that full information is revealed by a high quality firm’s comparative
iv
advertisement, where the advertisement on the rival’s product is negative. Moreover, full
revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome. The results imply that by allowing for neg-
ative advertisement on rivals’ products, a society can increase consumers’ welfare without
mandatory disclosure laws.
Keywords: cheap talk, uninformed sender, certification, advertisement, disclosure.
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1.0 INFORMATION TRANSMISSION WHEN UNINFORMED SENDERS
ARE PRESENT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Most literature regarding communication games has studied an environment where the re-
ceiver is sure of how informed the sender is. Crawford and Sobel [9] (CS) present a canonical
model, in which the sender is fully informed for certain and her preference is biased away
from the receiver’s. However, if informed experts and uninformed charlatans coexist and
they cannot verify or strategically do not reveal their informedness, then the receiver (or
decision maker) is uncertain of who is informed. For example, consider a customer in a retail
shop, who may want to ask an assistant for information about a product that he considers
purchasing. Because assistants work for the retailer and are not directly concerned with the
product, they may not be informed of the product. Thus, the customer bears uncertainty
about the assistant’s informedness as well as the product information. The customer must
take this into account when deciding to purchase the product. Other examples of uncer-
tain expertise can be found in lobbyist-legislator and medical doctor-patient relationships.
Lobbyists may have to give advice without full information on the state of the world, and
medical doctors may not catch up with up-to-date knowledge and technology. We model
this kind of receiver uncertainty by introducing an uninformed sender.
This chapter analyzes the effect of the presence of an uninformed sender on the informa-
tion transmission between an informed sender and the receiver. The model is based on CS,
but the sender is uninformed with a positive probability and, consequently, the receiver is
uncertain of the quality of information that he receives. Formally, the sender is an informed
expert with probability p ∈ (0, 1) and uninformed with 1−p. Whether the sender is informed
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or not is not verifiable to the receiver.
If the receiver could distinguish the expert from the uninformed sender, he could get
a higher expected payoff by consulting the informed expert rather than the uninformed
sender. As a result, the uninformed sender would play no parts and the outcome would be
just like the CS one. However, in the case in which the receiver is uncertain of the sender’s
informedness, the model has different outcomes. In almost all equilibria, the uninformed
sender pretends to be informed, that is, she behaves as a charlatan. Therefore, the informed
sender is willing to distinguish herself from the uninformed sender and for some p ∈ (0, 1)
there exists an equilibrium in which the informed sender’s cheap talk message conveys more
precise information. Because of this informational effect, the informed sender is better off
than she would be in the best CS equilibrium. This model is a one-shot game and the sender
does not care about future reputation. If the informed sender had a reputation for being well
informed, she would not have many incentives to transmit precise information (See Morris
[35] and Ottaviani and Sørensen [39, 40]).
We say that an equilibrium is influential if at least two actions are realized with a positive
probability as the outcome and that equilibrium η is more influential than equilibrium η′
if more actions are realized in η than η′. An equilibrium is often said to be informative if
the receiver’s updated belief after receiving a message is distinct from his prior belief. An
influential equilibrium is informative but the converse is not always true. The informativeness
can be measured by the receiver’s expected utility in cheap talk models with the uniform-
quadratic specification because its absolute value equals the residual variance of the receiver’s
expectation on the sender’s type. If information that the receiver receives is distorted by
the uninformed sender, a more influential equilibrium can be less informative than a CS
equilbrium. Thus, we borrow the influentialness concept in arguing improvement over the
CS model but will use the both concepts if there is no confusion.1
In this model with the uniform-quadratic specification, no information is conveyed when
the preference bias between the players is greater than or equal to 1/4 as in the CS model.
However, for example, a 3-step equilibrium exists even when the bias is greater than or equal
1See Austen-Smith [1, p.958] and Austen-Smith and Banks [2, p.5] for the concept of ‘influential’ versus
‘informative’.
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to 1/12 if p is not very high. For those values of b, there does not exist such an equilibrium
in the CS model. Generally speaking, for some p ∈ (0, 1), a more influential equilibrium
exists than the best (most influential) CS equilibrium when the uninformed sender pools
with middle interval types of the informed sender. In this equilibrium, the informed sender’s
expected utility is greater than that in the best CS equilibrium. However, the receiver’s
expected utility is less if the uninformed sender distorts the receiver’s inference by a large
amount although it is more influential.
Austen-Smith [1] analyzes the same situation with a verifiability assumption. In his
model, the informed sender can verify that she is informed so that the uninformed sender
cannot pretend to be informed. The sender’s information acquisition is costly and the prob-
ability of being informed is determined by the price of information. In that case, it is
reasonable that the informed sender’s claim that she is informed is verifiable. With this
assumption, there exists an influential equilibrium even for the bias between 1/4 and 1/2.
However, without verifiability, since the uninformed sender is able to mimic any types of the
informed sender, her message must be optimal over the messages that the informed sender
sends, which restricts the possible values of the bias that support influential equilibria.
Fischer and Stocken [11] and Ivanov [21] argue that more informative (or possibly more
influential) equilibrium can be attained by imposing restriction on the sender’s information
and reducing the information quality. On the other hand, our model studies the effect
of uncertainty about the sender’s information quality on the influentialness of equilibria.
Obviously, equilibria become less informative from the receiver’s standpoint because the
information is distorted by the uninformed sender pretending to be informed. However, the
informed sender’s message tends to be more informative and as a result more influential
equilibrium can be attained. Kurino and Lai [26] work on a similar model to this chapter
but the sender’s information structure is totally imperfect.
There is some literature on communication in uncertain environment. Blume et al. [5]
introduce noise in communication process and Goltsman et al. [14] identifies that an optimal
communication mechanism can be attained by the introduction of noise. Blume and Board [4]
show that the optimal outcome can be attained as well if the sender has private information
about message availability from a limited message space. In their another paper, [3], the
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sender takes vague messages strategically in communication to mitigate conflict, which leads
to welfare enhancement. Krishna and Morgan [25] allow for mutual communication between
the players, the outcome of which is uncertain, before the receiver takes an action. Morgan
and Stocken [34], Li [28], and Li and Madara´sz [29] introduce receiver uncertainty about
the preference bias. All of them show that informativeness can improve under the uncertain
environment, assuming that the receiver knows how informed the sender is.
The rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 1.2 presents the formal model and Section
1.3 characterizes the properties of equilibria. Section 1.4 analyzes the model in the uniform-
quadratic case in comparison with CS and Section 1.5 shows the equilibrium welfare results
with a particular example. Lastly, Section 1.6 summarizes the main results and some proofs
are in the appendix.
1.2 MODEL
This is an extension of the sender-receiver communication game. The sender learns her type,
t ∈ T = [0, 1], with probability p ∈ (0, 1), where t is distributed according to a common
prior density f with f(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Whether she knows her type or not, the
sender sends a message, m, to the receiver, who takes an action, a ∈ R, after observing a
message. Messages are irrelevant to the payoffs and taken from an arbitrary set M which is
large enough to convey whatever needs to be conveyed. The sender’s and receiver’s utilities
are given by uS(a, t) and uR(a, t) respectively. The utility functions are twice continuously
differentiable in both arguments and we assume that ui11 < 0 and u
i
12 > 0 for i = S,R with
subscripts describing partial derivatives. Define yS(t), yR(t) for given t and yR(t, t) for t < t
as
yi(t) := argmax
a∈R
ui(a, t), i = S,R,
yR(t, t) := argmax
a∈R
∫ t
t
uR(a, t)f(t) dt.
Assuming that for every t ∈ [0, 1], ui1(a, t) = 0 for some a ∈ R, then ui11 < 0 and ui12 > 0
imply that yi(t) and yR(t, t) are well-defined and strictly increasing in all arguments. Another
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crucial assumption on the preferences is that yS(t) 6= yR(t) for any t ∈ [0, 1], implying that
there is a conflict of interests between the sender and the receiver. By the continuity of yS(·)
and yR(·), we assume without loss of generality that yR(t) < yS(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
The informed sender’s pure strategy is a function of types, mI : T → M , and the
uninformed sender’s pure strategy is just to choose a message, mU ∈ M . Without loss of
generality, we assume that the informed sender only uses pure strategies.2 The uninformed
sender is allowed to mix messages so that her strategy is a probability distribution, q(·),
over the message space. The receiver will only use a pure strategy in equilibrium because
the utility function is strictly concave in a for every t ∈ T . The pure strategy is represented
by a real-valued function of messages, a : M → R. We say that an action a¯ is induced if
a(mI(t)) = a¯ for some t ∈ T or a(mU) = a¯ for mU ∈M such that q(mU) > 0.
The receiver is uncertain of both the sender’s informedness and the informed sender’s
type, but the probability p and the distribution of t are common knowledge. Therefore,
although the receiver observes neither the true value of the type nor even whether the
sender is informed or not, he can infer them from messages that he receives. On observing
message m ∈M , the receiver’s posterior belief about the sender’s type is denoted by µ(·|m).
Then, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the model is a profile of strategies and the receiver’s
belief, (mI(·), q(·), a(·), µ(·|·)), which satisfies:
(E1) ∀ t ∈ [0, 1], mI(t) ∈ argmax
m∈M
uS(a(m), t),
(E2) ∀mU ∈ supp(q), mU ∈ argmax
m∈M
∫ 1
0
uS(a(m), t)f(t) dt,
(E3) ∀m ∈M, a(m) ∈ argmax
a∈R
∫ 1
0
uR(a, t)µ(t|m) dt,
(E4) µ(·|m) is derived by Bayes’ rule if m = mI(t) for some t ∈ [0, 1] or q(m) > 0.
2If the uninformed sender is separating from the informed sender with a nondegenerate probability q ∈
(0, 1), then the types pooling with the uninformed sender with a positive probability must induce a = yR(0, 1)
in equilibrium whatever message they send. This is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium in which those
types pool with the uninformed sender on one message with probability 1. See Lemma 1 and Example 1. In
other cases, we can apply the same reasoning as in Theorem 1 and footnote 4 in CS. Thus, any equilibrium
is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium in which every informed type sends one message with probability 1.
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1.3 EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium. First, we begin with a lemma showing a
generic property of equilibria. For the lemma, we assume that the monotonicity condition,
(M), in CS is satisfied if the uninformed sender is not present.
Lemma 1. Suppose that mI(·), q(·), and a(·) constitute an equilibrium and q(mU) > 0
for some mU ∈ M . Then, mU 6= mI(t) for any t ∈ [0, 1] only if a(mI(t)) = yR(0, 1) for
some t ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, this equilibrium is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium in which
mU = mI(t) for that t.
Proof. Suppose that q(mU) > 0 and mU 6= mI(t) for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Then, a(mU) = yR(0, 1).
If a(mI(t)) = yR(0, 1) for some t ∈ [0, 1], then the type t and the uninformed sender freely
pool together without the outcome changed. This proves the second statement.
Suppose that a(mI(t)) 6= yR(0, 1) for any t ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that q(mI(t)) = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, 1] and that at least two actions are induced by the informed sender. Since the sender
reveals her informedness according to the strategy, the type space is partitioned in the same
manner in CS. Using the CS Corollary 1 under the monotonicity condition, we want to show
that
∃ t ∈ [0, 1] such that yS(t) = yR(0, 1),
because then the type t absolutely prefers mU to mI(t), which leads to a contradiction.
Suppose that yS(t) 6= yR(0, 1) for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Since yS(·) is continuous, we have two cases:
either
(i) yS(t) > yR(0, 1) for all t ∈ [0, 1]; or
(ii) yS(t) < yR(0, 1) for all t ∈ [0, 1].
If the latter case, (ii), holds, then yS(1) < yR(0, 1) for t = 1, but yR(0, 1) < yR(1) and this
contradicts yR(1) < yS(1). Thus, yS(t) > yR(0, 1) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. By the strictly increasing
yS(·), it is equivalent to that yS(0) > yR(0, 1). Since uS(yS(0), 0) > uS(yR(0, 1), 0) by the
definition of yS(·), yS(0) > yR(0, 1) > yR(0) and uS11 < 0 imply
uS(yR(0, 1), 0) > uS(yR(0), 0).
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Then, under condition (M) and by the CS Corollary 1, the equilibrium must be uninfluential.
This is a contradiction.
This is true because there exists t ∈ T that strictly prefers to pool with the uninformed
sender as long as a = yR(0, 1) is not induced by the informed sender. To understand
the lemma, take an example of uniform f and quadratic loss utility functions, uS(a, t) =
−(a − (t + b))2 and uR(a, t) = −(a − t)2, where b > 0. If the uninformed sender separates,
then her message induces the receiver to take a = 1/2, and t = 1/2− b, if b ≤ 1/2, certainly
prefers this action.3 In equilibrium, the uninformed sender separates only if a = 1/2 is
induced by the informed sender. Example 1 shows such an equilibrium.
Example 1. Suppose that f is uniform and the utility functions are of the quadratic loss
forms as specified in the above. Then, for b = 1/56, the following strategies constitute an
equilibrium in which the uninformed sender separates.
mI(t) =

m1, if t ∈ [0, 2/14),
m2, if t ∈ [2/14, 5/14),
m3, if t ∈ [5/14, 9/14),
m4, if t ∈ [9/14, 1].
mU = m′
a(m) =

2/28, if m = m1,
7/28, if m = m2,
14/28 (= 1/2), if m = m3 or m
′,
23/28, if m = m4,
a(m1), otherwise.
In Example 1, both the informed sender of type t ∈ [5/14, 9/14) and the uninformed
sender induce the same action a = 1/2. Thus, even if any of them randomly chooses between
m3 and m
′, it does not affect the equilibrium partition of the type space and the players’
3For b > 1/2, it is obvious that communication plays no role and every informed type induces a = 1/2 in
equilibrium.
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payoffs. In fact, if a = 1/2 is induced by some informed types, they can freely pool together
with the uninformed sender on the same message without the outcome changed.
By Lemma 1, any equilibrium in which the uninformed sender separates from the in-
formed sender is outcome equivalent to an equilibrium in which the uninformed sender pools
with a subset of types of the informed sender. Moreover, the nonseparating uninformed
sender is a generic property of equilibria. Thus, we assume without loss of generality that
the uninformed sender pretends to be informed unless she is strictly better off by revealing
herself.
The following lemma shows another property of equilibria: the actions induced in an
equilibrium are nondecreasing in types. It guarantees that the informed sender partitions
the type space into subintervals and reveals in which interval her type lies.
Lemma 2. Suppose that mI(·) and a(·) constitute an equilibrium. Then, a(mI(t)) is non-
decreasing in t.
Proof. Let t1 < t2 and suppose that a(m
I(t1)) = a1 and a(m
I(t2)) = a2. The informed
sender’s incentive compatibility, (E1), requires that
uS(a1, t1) ≥ uS(a2, t1), and
uS(a2, t2) ≥ uS(a1, t2).
Adding the two inequalities and rearranging the terms, we have
uS(a2, t2)− uS(a2, t1) ≥ uS(a1, t2)− uS(a1, t1). (1.1)
Given t1 and t2, differentiating u
S(a, t2)− uS(a, t1) with respect to a,
∂[uS(a, t2)− uS(a, t1)]
∂a
= uS1 (a, t2)− uS1 (a, t1) > 0
because t1 < t2 and u
S
12 > 0. Thus, u
S(a, t2) − uS(a, t1) is increasing in a and (1.1) implies
that a1 ≤ a2.
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Lemma 2 guarantees that the set of types that induce the same action in an equilibrium
is convex, so that all equilibria are partitional. If an action is induced by at most one
type, then the convexity is trivial. Let t < t and suppose that both t and t induce an
action a˜. Then, for any t ∈ (t, t), we must have a(mI(t)) ≤ a(mI(t)) ≤ a(mI(t)) and
since a(mI(t)) = a(mI(t)) = a˜, t also induces a˜. Thus, by this convexity and the monotone
a(mI(·)) together with the assumption that yR(t) < yS(t) for all t ∈ T , the informed sender’s
type space is partitioned into a finite number N of subintervals with boundary types 〈t0 =
0, t1, . . . , tN = 1〉 and N actions are induced as in the CS model. In fact, Lemma 2 holds
regardless of the presence of the uninformed sender.
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we are now ready to characterize the equilibrium when the
sender is uninformed with a positive probability. Given p ∈ (0, 1), there exists an integer N
such that the type space is partitioned into N subintervals, the informed types in the same
interval induce the same action, and the uninformed sender pools with a subset of informed
types. Essentially, any equilibrium belongs to one in this class. Obviously, the uninformative
equilibrium (N = 1) always exists in which mI(t) = m◦ for all t ∈ T , q(·) is arbitrary, and
a(m) = yR(0, 1) with µ(·|m) = f(·) for all m ∈M . In the rest of this section, we characterize
the general form of equilibrium.
First, consider the sender’s strategy. Suppose that the informed sender of type t sends
mI(t) = mi if t ∈ [ti−1, ti), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where t0 = 0 and tN = 1, and the uninformed
sender’s strategy q(·) is such that if q(mU) > 0 then mU = mk for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
The uninformed sender will mix over at most two messages because the utility is strictly
concave in a. Moreover, the randomization of the two messages constitutes an equilibrium
only if they induce adjacent two actions.
Given mI(·) and q(·), the receiver forms his belief on t after observing mi as
µ(t|mi) =

φ(mi)
f(t)∫ ti
ti−1
f(τ) dτ
+ [1− φ(mi)]f(t) if t ∈ [ti−1, ti),
φ(mi) · 0 + [1− φ(mi)]f(t) if t /∈ [ti−1, ti),
where φ(mi) is the receiver’s posterior belief that the sender is informed on observing the
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message mi. φ(mi) is derived by Bayes’ rule as
φ(mi) =
p
∫ ti
ti−1
f(τ) dτ
p
∫ ti
ti−1
f(τ) dτ + (1− p)q(mi)
.
In words, if the receiver observes mi, he believes that t is distributed on [ti−1, ti) according
to the density f(t)/
∫ ti
ti−1
f(τ) dτ with probability φ(mi) and on [0, 1] according to the prior
density f(t) with 1 − φ(mi). Thus, given the beliefs, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N , the receiver’s
optimal action a(mi) when observing mi solves
max
a∈R
{
φ(mi)
∫ ti
ti−1
uR(a, t)
f(t)∫ ti
ti−1
f(τ) dτ
dt+ [1− φ(mi)]
∫ 1
0
uR(a, t)f(t) dt
}
and therefore,
a(mi) = φ(mi) y
R(ti−1, ti) + [1− φ(mi)] yR(0, 1).
Let a(mi) ≡ ai. For any unsent message m ∈ M \ {m1,m2, . . . ,mN}, specify a(m) as any
a ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , aN} with the receiver believing that t is in one of the intervals, [ti−1, ti), with
probability
∫ ti
ti−1
µ(t|mi) dt.
For mI(·) and q(·) to be the best responses to a(·), (E1) and (E2) require that
(i) (Arbitrage condition) For the informed sender,
uS(ai, ti) = u
S(ai+1, ti) for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
(ii) For the uninformed sender, if q(mk) > 0 for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
∫ 1
0
uS(ak, t)f(t) dt ≥
∫ 1
0
uS(ai, t)f(t) dt for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N.
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Thus, the profile of the specified strategies and beliefs, (mI(·), q(·), a(·), µ(·|·)), is an equilib-
rium if the two conditions, (i) and (ii), are satisfied.
If uS(a, t) satisfies certainty equivalence, we can say more about the uninformed sender’s
incentive. Certainty equivalence of an objective function is a convenient property to analyze
the optimization problem in uncertain environment. For an uncertain parameter t, we say
that uS(a, t) satisfies certainty equivalence if
argmax
a
∫ 1
0
uS(a, t)f(t) dt ≡ argmax
a
uS(a,E[t]).
The property says that the optimization problem under uncertainty is equivalent to the
problem with the certain parameter t = E[t]. If uS(a, t) has the certainty equivalence
property, then the uninformed sender has the same incentives as the type t = E[t] of the
informed sender because her expected type is E[t]. Then, it is straightforward that the
uninformed sender pools with t = E[t] in equilibrium. Therefore, the uninformed sender’s
incentive compatibility condition, (ii), amounts to Proposition 1 with the help of (E1).
Proposition 1. Assume that uS(a, t) has the certainty equivalence property. Then, if q(·)
constitutes an equilibrium and q(mk) > 0 for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, then tk−1 ≤ E[t] ≤ tk.
Moreover, if q(·) is nondegenerate so that q(mk) = qk ∈ (0, 1) and q(mk+1) = 1−qk for some
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, then E[t] = tk.
Proof. If q(·) constitutes an equilibrium, then by (E2), q(mk) > 0 implies that
ak ∈ argmax
a∈{a1,a2,...,aN}
∫ 1
0
uS(a, t)f(t) dt.
Then, by the certainty equivalence property of uS(a, t),
ak ∈ argmax
a∈{a1,a2,...,aN}
uS(a,E[t]).
This implies that by (E1), E[t] ∈ [tk−1, tk]. If q(mk) = qk and q(mk+1) = 1 − qk for some
qk ∈ (0, 1), then by the same argument,
{ak, ak+1} = argmax
a∈{a1,a2,...,aN}
∫ 1
0
uS(a, t)f(t) dt
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and equivalently,
{ak, ak+1} = argmax
a∈{a1,a2,...,aN}
uS(a,E[t]).
This implies that the type t = E[t] is indifferent between ak and ak+1 and we must have
E[t] = tk.
The certainty equivalence property is satisfied in examples of the quadratic utility func-
tions prevailing in literature. With uS(a, t) = −(a − (t + b))2, it is true that E[uS(a, t)] =
uS(a,E[t])−Var(t) and the certainty equivalence property is satisfied for any f . More gener-
ally, with uS(a, t) = −|a− (t+ b)|n, the certainty equivalence property holds for any positive
integer n if f is symmetric. Under the certainty equivalence property, the uninformed sender
always pools with the informed sender of type t = E[t]. Therefore, when the uninformed
sender uses a pure strategy mU = mk, it must be that tk−1 ≤ E[t] ≤ tk in equilibrium, which
describes the uninformed sender’s incentive compatibility. As for mixed strategy equilibrium,
the uninformed sender randomizes adjacent two messages, say mk and mk+1, only if the type
t = E[t] is indifferent over the actions induced by those messages. This implies that t = E[t]
is the boundary type tk between the subintervals sending those messages.
1.4 THE UNIFORM-QUADRATIC CASE
In this section, we analyze the model with the uniform-quadratic example. We assume that
f(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1] and the utility functions are given by
uS(a, t) = −(a− (t+ b))2,
uR(a, t) = −(a− t)2,
where b ∈ (0,∞). The interest conflict between the sender and the receiver is measured by
a parameter b because yS(t) − yR(t) = b for all t ∈ [0, 1]. The quadratic loss form of the
utility functions satisfy all the assumptions on the preferences, condition (M) without the
uninformed sender, and the certainty equivalence property.
To recap, for given p ∈ (0, 1) and b ∈ (0,∞), there exists an N -step equilibrium such
that
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(i) mI(t) = mi if t ∈ [ti−1, ti), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where t0 = 0 and tN = 1,
(ii) q(·) is such that if q(mU) > 0 then mU = mk for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and
(iii) a(mi) ≡ ai = φ(mi)ti−1 + ti
2
+ [1− φ(mi)]1
2
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, where
φ(mi) =
p(ti − ti−1)
p(ti − ti−1) + (1− p)q(mi) .
In equilibrium, the uninformed sender mixes over at most adjacent two messages, say mk and
mk+1, and for expositional convenience, we denote her strategy by m
U = qkmk+(1−qk)mk+1
hereafter, describing that q(mk) = qk and q(mk+1) = 1 − qk. For the specified strategies to
constitute an equilibrium, the incentive compatibilities require that
(iv) −(ai − (ti + b))2 = −(ai+1 − (ti + b))2, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1, and
(v) if mU = mk, then tk−1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ tk; and if mU = qkmk+(1− qk)mk+1 for qk ∈ (0, 1), then
tk = 1/2.
First, we check the condition for the existence of an influential and so informative equi-
librium.
Proposition 2. When b ≥ 1/4, all equilibria are uninformative for any p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Construct the sender’s strategies as mI(t) = m1 if t ∈ [0, t1), mI(t) = m2 if t ∈ [t1, 1],
and mU = q1m1 + (1− q1)m2, where q1 ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the receiver’s optimal actions are
a1 =
pt1
pt1 + (1− p)q1 ·
t1
2
+
(1− p)q1
pt1 + (1− p)q1 ·
1
2
,
a2 =
p(1− t1)
p(1− t1) + (1− p)(1− q1) ·
t1 + 1
2
+
(1− p)(1− q1)
p(1− t1) + (1− p)(1− q1) ·
1
2
.
From the arbitrage condition for t1, −(a1 − (t1 + b))2 = −(a2 − (t1 + b))2, we have
t1 =
a1 + a2
2
− b.
Note from the above expression for a1 and a2 that 0 ≤ a1 ≤ 1/2 and 1/2 ≤ a2 ≤ 1 for any
p ∈ (0, 1) and q1 ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that
1
4
− b ≤ t1 ≤ 3
4
− b.
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For a 2-step equilibrium to exist, t1 must lie in the interior of the type space and we need
1/4 − b > 0 and 3/4 − b < 1. The latter is always true for b > 0, and thus, if the former
does not hold, then a 2-step equilibrium does not exit at all. Therefore, if b ≥ 1/4, only
equilibrium is uninformative.
Proposition 2 is evident when we construct 2-step equilibria and identify the values of b
supporting the equilibria. There are three different 2-step equilibria depending on b. First,
when b ≤ 1−p
4(2−p) for given p ∈ (0, 1), there exists a 2-step equilibrium in which the uninformed
sender pretends that she is informed of a low type with a positive probability:
q1 = 1 and t1 =
1
4p
(
−3 + 4p− 4bp+
√
9− 8p− 8bp+ 16b2p2
)
; or
q1 =
−p+ 8b− 8bp+√p2 + 64b2
16b(1− p) and t1 =
1
2
.
Since 1−p
4(2−p) cannot exceed 1/8, if b ≥ 1/8, there does not exist a 2-step equilibrium with
q1 > 0 for any p ∈ (0, 1).
If the informed sender can verify that she is informed as in Austen-Smith [1], we can
show that for any p ∈ (0, 1), a 2-step equilibrium exists for b < 1/2 as long as low types
pool with the uninformed sender. This is because the uninformed sender has no choice over
messages and we only need the condition that t1 should lie in (0, 1). However, without
verifiability, the uninformed sender is free to mimic any types so that her choice of message
must be incentive compatible over messages that the informed sender sends. This additional
constraint requires that t1 ≥ 1/2 and shrinks the range of b that supports the equilibria.
We now construct the other kind of 2-step equilibrium, in which the uninformed sender
pretends to be a high type with probability 1. Such an equilibrium exists for any p ∈ (0, 1)
if b < 1/4, where
q1 = 0 and t1 =
1
4p
(
3− 4bp−
√
9− 8p+ 8bp+ 16b2p2
)
.
From the construction of all 2-step equilibria, we can see that if b ≥ 1/4, cheap talk messages
cannot be informative for any p ∈ (0, 1) no matter what types the uninformed sender pretends
to be. For those values of b, as Crawford and Sobel [9] show, the only equilibrium is totally
uninformative without the uninformed sender as well. Thus, with the uniform-quadratic
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specification, if b ≥ 1/4, no information is transmitted whether the sender is informed for
certain or not.4
However, for some p ∈ (0, 1), there exists b < 1/4 that supports more influential equilib-
rium than the most influential equilibrium without the uninformed sender. An equilibrium
can be more influential when the uninformed sender pools with middle interval types. First,
we consider the two extreme cases in which the uninformed sender pools with either the
highest interval types or the lowest interval types. These equilibria can never improve in
influentialness.
Proposition 3. For N ≥ 2, there exists an N-step equilibrium in which mU = m1 if
b ≤ 2− pN
4(2− p)N(N − 1) .
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4. For N ≥ 3, there exists an N-step equilibrium in which mU = mN if
pN − 2
4(2− p)N(N − 1) ≤ b <
N − 1−√(1− p)N(N − 2) + 1
2pN(N − 1)(N − 2) .
Proof. See the appendix.
We can easily check that for any p ∈ (0, 1), the supremum of b that supports N -step
equilibrium in either case is less than that in the CS N -step equilibrium. Let b¯Nk (p) be the
supremum of b that supports N -step equilibrium with mU = mk for given p ∈ (0, 1), and b¯NCS
be the supremum of b that supports CS N -step equilibrium. Notice that b¯N1 (p) in Proposition
3 is decreasing in p, and as p goes to zero, it goes up to 1/[4N(N − 1)], which is a half of
b¯NCS = 1/[2N(N−1)]. Also, notice that in Proposition 4, b¯NN(p) is increasing in p, and that as
p goes to 1, the equilibrium partition and b¯NN(p) converge to those in the CS model. Thus, if
the uninformed sender mimics the lowest types or the highest types, then for any p ∈ (0, 1),
given b > 0, the equilibria cannot be more influential than the best CS equilibrium. A 2-step
equilibrium belongs to either of the extreme cases (although Proposition 4 holds for N ≥ 3)
and b¯2k(p) cannot exceed 1/4 for any k = 1, 2 and p ∈ (0, 1).
4When b = 1/4, there exists an equilibrium in which only the type t = 0 sends m1 and all other types send
m2. This event occurs with probability zero and t = 0 is indifferent between revealing and disguising herself.
Therefore, this equilibrium yields the essentially equivalent outcome to the uninformative equilibrium.
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Moreover, the largest N is bounded for any positive value of b, implying that the infor-
mativeness of cheap talk messages is limited even if the interest conflict is very small.
Corollary 1. Given p ∈ (0, 1), N is bounded for any b ∈ (0,∞) if mU = m1 or mU = mN .
Proof. Recall that b > 0. For given p ∈ (0, 1), such b that supports the equilibria exists when
N < 2/p in Proposition 3 and when N < 4/p in Proposition 4.
The largest N cannot exceed 2/p when mU = m1 and 4/p when m
U = mN even as b goes
to zero. Since the largest N is nonincreasing in p, a low probability (1− p) of the existence
of the uninformed sender disturbs information flow significantly. For example, consider p
close to one. When mU = m1, if p ∈ [2/3, 1), N < 2/p implies that the most influential
equilibrium is not more than 2-step for any b ∈ (0,∞). As for the case that mU = mN , the
most influential equilibrium is not more than 4-step for p close to one. We constructed the
2-step equilibrium in the above for p ∈ (0, 1) when b < 1/4. For N ≥ 3, N < 4/p implies
that N < 5 if p ∈ [0.8, 1).
Recall that the incentive compatibilities require that the uninformed sender pool with
the type t = E[t]. The equilibria with the uninformed sender mimicking the lowest types
or the highest types cannot be more influential at all than the best CS equilibrium. This is
because in the two extreme cases, the left-end interval or the right-end interval must contain
E[t] = 1/2 so that the complement segment of the type space is relatively small to be divided
into subintervals. On the other hand, it is conceivable that given b, the type space can be
partitioned into more number of elements when the uninformed sender pools with middle
interval types. Only in the case, the largest N goes to infinity as b goes to zero. Moreover,
there exists b > 0 for which more influential equilibrium exists than the best CS equilibrium
for some p ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 5. Suppose that N ≥ 3. For some p ∈ (0, 1), there exists k such that 1 < k < N
and b¯Nk (p) > b¯
N
CS.
Proof. See the appendix.
The influentialness can improve when the uninformed sender pools with middle interval
types. Proposition 5 states that for some p ∈ (0, 1) the supremum of b that supports
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N -step equilibrium is greater than that in the CS N -step equilibrium. This implies that
the influentialness improves over the best CS equilibrium if an uninformed sender exists.
Specifically, the improvement occurs when the uninformed sender pools with the mid-interval
types, [tN−1
2
, tN+1
2
), for an odd number N and when she pools with the types [tN
2
, tN
2
+1) for
an even number N . The following examples are the cases of N = 3 and 4.
Example 2. When b ≤ 9−8p
24(3−2p) , there exists a 3-step equilibrium in which m
U = m2, where
t1 =
9− 8p− 36b+ 24bp
3(9− 8p) and t2 =
18− 16p− 36b+ 24bp
3(9− 8p) .
Example 3. When b < 9−8p
24(6−5p) , there exists a 4-step equilibrium in which m
U = m3, where
t1 =
1
8p
(
45− 40p− 24bp− 3
√
225− 416p+ 16bp+ 192p2 + 64b2p2
)
,
t2 =
1
4p
(
45− 40p− 8bp− 3
√
225− 416p+ 16bp+ 192p2 + 64b2p2
)
,
t3 =
1
8p
(
75− 64p− 8bp− 5
√
225− 416p+ 16bp+ 192p2 + 64b2p2
)
.
Example 2 shows that if the uninformed sender mimics the mid-interval types, then for
b ∈ [1/12, 1/8), a 3-step equilibrium exists as long as p is small enough. Formally speaking,
if p ≤ 3/4, then b¯32(p) = 9−8p24(3−2p) ≥ 1/12 and for b ∈ [1/12, b¯32(p)], there exists a 3-step
equilibrium under the receiver uncertainty. As p gets close to 0, b¯32(p) goes up to 1/8. Notice
that for b ∈ [1/12, 1/4), any equilibria induce at most two actions when the sender is informed
for certain.
The supremum of b that supports 4-step equilibria in CS is 1/24. However, in Example
3, we can identify that b¯43(p) =
9−8p
24(6−5p) > 1/24 for all p ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, if the uninformed
sender pools with [t2, t3), then for b ∈ [1/24, b¯43(p)), a 4-step equilibrium exists for any
p ∈ (0, 1). As p gets close to zero, b¯43(p) goes up to 1/16.
We have seen that the supremum of b is greater than in the CS model to support an
N -step equilibrium when the uninformed sender pools with middle interval types. More
influential equilibrium exists than the best CS equilibrium and thus, the presence of the
uninformed sender can make the informed sender transmit more precise information to the
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decision maker. However, this does not mean that the decision maker receives more pre-
cise information. The quality of information received is coarser because the information is
distorted by the uninformed sender.
1.5 WELFARE
In this section, we keep working with the uniform-quadratic case on welfare analysis. We
denote the informed sender’s and the uninformed sender’s expected utilities by EU IS and
EUUS respectively. In an equilibrium in which mU = mk, they are calculated as
EU IS =
N∑
i=1
∫ ti
ti−1
−(ai − (t+ b))2 dt,
EUUS =
∫ 1
0
−(ak − (t+ b))2 dt,
and the sender’s and the receiver’s ex ante expected utilities are obtained as
EUS = pEU IS + (1− p)EUUS,
EUR = p
N∑
i=1
∫ ti
ti−1
−(ai − t)2 dt+ (1− p)
∫ 1
0
−(ak − t)2 dt,
respectively. In this model, it still holds that EUS = EUR − b2 in any equilibria and,
hence, they are Pareto ranked. Thus, the sender and the receiver will coordinate on the
best equilibrium at the ex ante state. However, it is possible that the best equilibrium is
ex ante Pareto dominated by the best CS equilibrium even though it is more influential.
This is because the introduction of uncertainty about the sender’s informedness makes the
environment of communication worse and the quality of information that the receiver receives
is coarser. We can see an example in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 shows the expected utilities in all equilibria when p = 0.25 and b = 0.1.
EUSCS and EU
R
CS denote the sender’s and the receiver’s expected utilities, respectively, in a
CS equilibrium. Note that a mixed strategy equilibrium is dominated by a pure strategy
equilibrium, so only consider pure strategy equilibria. When b = 0.1, the 2-step equilibrium
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Table 1.1: The expected utilities when p = 0.25 and b = 0.1
EU IS EUUS EUR EUSCS EU
R
CS
1-step equilibrium −0.0933 −0.0933 −0.0833 −0.0933 −0.0833
2-step equilibrium
mU = m1 −0.0319 −0.1017 −0.0743
mU = m2 −0.0702 −0.0894 −0.0746 −0.0408 −0.0308
mU = q1m1 + (1− q1)m2 −0.0338 −0.1018 −0.0748
3-step equilibrium
mU = m2 −0.0196 −0.0964 −0.0672 — —
mU = q2m2 + (1− q2)m3 −0.0250 −0.0965 −0.0686
is the best in the CS model in which the sender is informed for certain. If the uninformed
sender is present with probability 0.75 (= 1−p), the best equilibrium is now of 3-step with the
uninformed sender pooling with the mid-interval types. Thus, the informed sender’s messages
convey more precise information, and so the receiver might be better off by this informational
effect. However, the received information is distorted by the uninformed sender, which
dominates the informational effect and the receiver is worse off.
We may think of the informed sender and the uninformed sender as different agents
in that informed experts and uninformed charlatans coexist in the real world. When the
uninformed sender is present, the informed sender’s expected utility can be higher than
that in the best CS equilibrium. Consider again the case in which b = 0.1. Then, the
best CS equilibrium is of 2-step and EUSCS = −0.0408. When the uninformed sender exists
with probability 1 − p, a 3-step equilibrium exists for p ≤ 9/16, in which the uninformed
sender pretends to be one of the mid-interval types (See Example 2). The informed sender’s
expected utility is
EU IS = −9.43407(p− 1.125)(p
2 − 2.28392p+ 1.32286)
(8p− 9)3 ,
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which is decreasing in p, and EU IS = −0.0206 when p = 9/16. Hence, EU IS > EUSCS for
all p ∈ (0, 9/16]. That is, the informed sender can be better off by the uninformed sender
pooling with the mid-interval types.
As Table 1.1 shows, when p = 0.25, the informed sender’s expected utility is higher in
both the 2-step equilibrium with mU = m1 and the 3-step equilibrium with m
U = m2 than
that in the best CS equilibrium if we only consider pure strategy equilibria. For the informed
sender, the 3-step equilibrium is the best. However, for the uninformed sender, the 2-step
equilibrium with mU = m2 is the best, which gives her higher expected utility than that in
the uninformative equilibrium which would be unique if the informed sender were absent.
Thus, they have a conflict over the preferred equilibria.
1.6 CONCLUSION
The main results of this chapter are summarized as follows. When an uninformed sender ex-
ists and the decision maker cannot distinguish her from the informed expert, the uninformed
sender has an incentive to pretend to be informed. Since the informed sender is willing to
distinguish herself from the uninformed sender, the informed sender’s cheap talk message
conveys more precise information. Because of this informational effect, the informed sender
is better off by the presence of the uninformed sender. However, the information received
by the decision maker is distorted and the decision maker is worse off if the distortion effect
is large.
In this model with the uninformed sender, there are much more equilibria than in the
CS model and the equilibrium selection problem is severe. If an N -step equilibrium exists,
then for every integer M ≤ N , various kinds of M -step equilibria exist. If we consider the
informed sender and the uninformed sender as different agents, it is not easy to find which
equilibrium is the best because there is a conflict over equilibria among the three agents.
However, at the ex ante stage, all equilibria are Pareto ranked and the agents will coordinate
on the best equilibrium.
This chapter is different from the existing studies in that the receiver is uncertain of how
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informed the sender is. However, we only considered an extreme case in which the sender
is either fully informed or fully uninformed. The model can be generalized by introducing a
partially informed sender but we conjecture that the results will not change qualitatively.
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2.0 COSTLY CERTIFICATION OF PRODUCT QUALITY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In a product market with uncertain quality, informed sellers have incentives to reveal the
product information to increase the profits unless revelation cost is high. They are allowed
to reveal possibly vague information directly but not allowed to misreport it. Such a feature
on messages reflects the situations where the messages take the form of a certificate issued
by an organization that has public’s trust such as an ISO standard, where sellers display or
demonstrate an object, or where lying is virtually impossible because it is very expensive by
the law or future reputation.
When disclosure is costless, the private information is fully revealed as a unique equi-
librium outcome (Grossman and Hart [16], Grossman [15], Milgrom [33], Jovanovic [23],
Okuno-Fujiwara et al. [38], and Seidmann and Winter [43]). Consider a disclosure problem
of product quality by sellers to buyers. Let θ be a random variable, which represents the
quality of a product to be traded, the sellers’ private information. A representative buyer’s
utility is increasing in θ, but he only knows the distribution of θ over the set of all possible
qualities. Each seller may report or hide any information about the quality but is not allowed
to misreport it. As is well known, if disclosure is costless, a seller informs buyers that her
product quality is at least as good as its true value, θ¯, and the buyers infer that θ = θ¯ with
probability 1. In this manner, the product information is fully revealed.
In many cases, a seller’s verifiable message is costly: for example, product demonstra-
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tions1, statements of objective inspections in a used-car market2, and product specifications
that can be obtained by experiments or quality testing. Revelation cost is one factor of
failure of full revelation with voluntary disclosure and the revelation of uncertain informa-
tion does not guarantee an increase in social welfare. The literature shows that the market
outcome leads to an excessive disclosure in view of social welfare even though it is not full
revelation (Jovanovic [23] and Cheong and Kim [7]). However, it goes too far because the
social value of information is not considered in the models. We introduce a variable that
generates social value of information, which is buyer’s action such as the usage and mainte-
nance of the product after purchase. The new variable explains that the seller is still willing
to reveal the private information even if the revelation incurs a cost.
An important result of this chapter is that if the buyer is concerned about his action,
more information is revealed by the seller. Even though the product is of high quality,
inappropriate use prevents the buyers from enjoying the full benefits. Only buyers who have
received full information can use it most effectively. The buyer’s concern about the effective
use affects the seller’s incentive to reveal the private information. We show that the seller is
more willing to reveal when the effectiveness of use matters. Furthermore, more information
is revealed as the variance of the uncertain quality is larger or as the average quality is lower.
Since the uncertainty lowers the price by the variance, the seller is more willing to reveal the
quality in order to raise the price.
A certificate may prove either precise or partial information, but more commonly it only
proves partial information as in Lipman and Seppi [30] and Wolinsky [46] because it is hard
to prove claims precisely. Moreover, it is a reasonable assumption that the certification cost is
increasing, that is, a better certificate is more costly. Certifying high quality is more costly
because it needs more tests, more time, or higher technology. Nonetheless, the standard
assumption in costly disclosure models is that sellers can either disclose the true quality at
a flat cost whatever the quality is or simply conceal the information (for example, Jovanovic
[23] and Cheong and Kim [7]). This environment leads to a unique equilibrium in which
each seller discloses the true quality if it exceeds a threshold level and does not otherwise.
1As examples of costly product demonstration, Cheong and Kim [7] introduce free samples of cosmetics
and demo versions of computer software.
2Grossman [15] takes this example as costly certificates.
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We assume in the model that a seller certifies that the quality is at least a minimum level
and the certification cost is increasing in the minimum quality. The seller is not allowed to
forge any certificates stating that the minimum quality exceeds the true value because of a
technical issue or an antifraud law. In this model, there are multiple equilibria unless the
certification costs are too high or too low. We show that the least level of revelation is ex
ante Pareto optimal and no-revelation is the best if it is one of the equilibrium outcomes.
If the social value of information was not considered, the optimal level of revelation might
be underestimated. However, with buyer’s action involved in the model as a variable that
generates social value of information, more information is revealed in the optimal equilibrium
as compared with the case in which the buyer is only concerned about the quality.
There are many variations in models of costly disclosure. As in the above standard
models, full revelation is not generally an equilibrium with voluntary disclosure. Grossman
and Hart [16] analyze a takeover bid process with the relevance to the disclosure problem.
Lizzeri [31] introduces a certification intermediary into a seller-buyer model. The intermedi-
ary chooses a flat certification fee and a disclosure rule, and then the seller decides whether
to pay the fee and have the test results disclosed under the disclosure rule. Levin et al.
[27] analyze the effect of competition on disclosure level. They show that disclosure level is
higher under a monopoly cartel than under duopoly.
The models above as well as ours are concerned with how the information is revealed
with disclosure itself through verifiable messages when disclosure cost is not too high. In
Grossman [15], however, in the case that information is too costly to certify, sellers instead
give warranties on ex post realized breakdown of products to buyers as an indirect means of
conveying information. In this case, assuming that quality is different only in the probability
of breakdown, the optimal warranty is full coverage for breakdown regardless of the quality,
and buyers do not care about the quality with the full warranty. Hence, when disclosure is
costly, private information is not revealed even with warranties.
Some studies show that full revelation may fail even if disclosure is costless. Board [6]
and Hotz and Xiao [19] report competition among firms as alleviating the firms’ incentive
to disclose private information. In Board [6], when firms are involved in price competition
in duopoly with vertical differentiation, the firm with a lower quality product may choose
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not to disclose the quality to consumers, depending on the quality level. Hotz and Xiao [19]
analyze a circumstance in which products are differentiated horizontally as well as vertically.
Quality disclosure makes the products more substitutable in a market in which they are
already differentiated horizontally. This induces intensive price competition among firms,
resulting in a decrease in their profits. Therefore, full disclosure is not the best for the
firms. In their cases, mandatory disclosure laws ensure that consumers gain in markets with
asymmetric information while the firms’ profits decrease.
Also, uncertain environment prevents full revelation even with costless disclosure. If the
informed party’s information structure is uncertain, that is, the informed party is imperfectly
informed with a positive probability (Shin [45]), if the informed party’s preferences are
uncertain (Wolinsky [46]), or if there are buyers who cannot interpret disclosed information
(Fishman and Hagerty [12]), then full revelation may not occur. Harbaugh and To [18]
present receiver’s private information as another source of revelation failure. They show
that no-revelation can be an equilibrium if the number of verifiable messages available to
the sender is limited and the receiver has private information about the sender’s type.
In most models of disclosure, sellers are assumed to be originally informed. On the other
hand, there is similar but different literature in which sellers do not know the quality of their
own products but can still decide to acquire the information at some or no cost. Once they
acquire the information, they can disclose it without a cost. Matthews and Postlewaite [32]
analyze costless information acquisition when the seller does not know the quality before
testing. In Farrell [10] and Shavell [44], information acquisition is costly.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives the basic model and
Section 2.3 specifies the seller’s optimal pricing rule. In Section 2.4, necessary conditions for
equilibrium certification are derived. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 characterize fully revealing and
non-revealing equilibrium, and the welfare aspects on equilibria follows in Section 2.7. In
Section 2.8, we introduce buyer’s action into the model and compare the seller’s incentive to
reveal information with the basic model. Lastly, Section 2.9 summarizes and concludes the
chapter.
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2.2 THE BASIC MODEL
Consider a market for a product with asymmetric information on the quality between a seller
and a buyer. The seller owns a product for sale and knows its quality θ. She is concerned
about the price p ∈ R+ that she can receive. The quality θ is relevant to the buyer’s utility
but the product is assumed to be an experience good3 so that the buyer learns its quality
only after he consumes it. Before the trade, the buyer only knows the distribution F over
Θ = [0, 1], the set of all possible qualities. Once the seller charges a price p, the buyer decides
whether or not to purchase the product at that price.
The seller can certify the product quality at some cost c before she charges a price. A
certificate (verifiable message) is denoted by m ∈ M = [0, 1], which proves that the true
quality θ belongs to [m, 1]. In words, the seller can only certify that the quality is at least
some value, m. This reflects the situation in which it is really hard to prove what the true
quality is exactly. For instance, for θ ∈ Θ, the accurate certificate stating θ ∈ {θ} is in fact
impossible except for the highest quality, θ = 1. If the product passes a high-quality test, its
quality is definitely high, but the high quality product could pass a low-quality test as well.
Thus, by the low-quality test, we cannot conclude that the quality is low. Since the seller
cannot certify that her product quality exceeds the true value, the feasible certificates of the
seller of θ ∈ Θ is M(θ) = [0, θ].4 Denoting by c(m) the certification cost of m, we assume
that c(·) is differentiable, c′(m) > 0 for all m ∈M , and c(0) = 0, so that a better certificate
is more costly.
Until Section 2.7, we analyze the model without buyer’s action after purchase. The
sequence of the game in a benchmark is summarized as follows:
1. The seller of θ ∈ Θ reports a certificate m ∈M(θ) to the buyer at cost of c(m).
2. The seller charges a price p ∈ R+.
3. The buyer decides whether or not to purchase the product.
If the seller sells her product at price p, then the seller’s profit is pi = p− c. If the trade
3This classification follows Nelson [36].
4With these feasible certificates, product quality is only partially provable except for the highest quality.
It is common as shown in Austen-Smith [1], Lipman and Seppi [30], and Wolinsky [46].
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fails, assuming that just holding the product does not benefit the seller, she only loses c. On
the other hand, the buyer enjoys benefit θ by consuming a product of quality θ. The buyer’s
utility is the net benefit from the purchase, that is, u = θ − p, and the reservation utility is
assumed to be zero.
2.3 PRICING RULE
We will use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the equilibrium concept for this model. The
seller reports information about her product quality to the buyer through a certificate.
Given the certificate, the price is determined as the buyer’s expected quality. Let p(·) be
a seller’s pricing rule under which p(m) is the price that the seller charges for the product
after reporting a certificate m. Let Eµ represent the buyer’s expectation associated with his
belief µ, which is a probability distribution over Θ.
According to the game theory, the pricing rule should be depicted by a function of
(θ,m) ∈ Θ×M(θ) and the belief be conditional on (m, p) ∈M×R+. In this model, however,
prices never signal the product quality and thus do not influence the buyer’s expectation
on the quality because once the seller reports a certificate, then she charges the same price
regardless of the quality. The reasoning is as follows. Suppose that the seller charges different
prices depending on qualities after reporting m. If the seller of high quality product charges
a higher price and the buyer purchases the product at that price, then the low quality seller
profitably deviates to that price. If the buyer does not purchase at the higher price, then the
seller lowers the price so that the buyer may purchase. Thus, the equilibrium pricing rule
does not depend on qualities and, consequently, the buyer’s belief about the quality does
not depend on prices. For out-of-equilibrium prices, we assume that the buyer forms the
same belief. Therefore, in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the optimal pricing rule and the
buyer’s posterior expectations only depend on m, and we denote them without any loss by
p(m) and Eµ[θ|m] instead of p(θ,m) and Eµ[θ|m, p].5
5The situation is equivalent to a model in which there are at least two buyers and the buyers bid a price
for the product simultaneously after observing a certificate m instead of the seller asking a price. In this
case, under the assumption that each buyer has the same valuation on the product, the buyer’s bidding rule
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Assume that the buyer buys the product if the purchase gives him nonnegative expected
utility. Then, given a buyer’s belief µ, the seller’s equilibrium pricing rule p(·) is such that
p(m) = Eµ[θ|m] if she reports m to the buyer. To prove it, suppose that the seller has
reported a certificate m at cost of c(m). If the buyer purchases the product at price p
after observing m, his expected utility conditional on m is Eµ[u|m] = Eµ[θ|m] − p. Any
p > Eµ[θ|m] is dominated by lower prices for the seller because the buyer does not purchase
the product at that price and the seller only loses the certification cost. Thus, for given m,
the profit is maximized when the seller charges p(m) = Eµ[θ|m].
The seller charges the price equal to the buyer’s expectation on the quality so that
the buyer’s expected utility from the purchase is zero. This implies that the seller takes
the buyer’s expected surplus. With the optimal pricing rule, the seller wants to choose a
certificate m in order to maximize the buyer’s expected quality conditional on her report
less the certification cost, Eµ[θ|m]− c(m).
2.4 EQUILIBRIUM CERTIFICATION
In the above, we have specified the equilibrium pricing rule as p(·) = Eµ[θ|·], under which
the buyer always purchases the product. Given the pricing rule and a buyer’s belief µ, now
the seller must choose a certificate to maximize the profit. That is, for each θ¯ ∈ Θ, the seller
faces the following problem:
max
m∈M(θ¯)
pi = Eµ[θ|m]− c(m). (2.1)
Let σ be a seller’s certification strategy, where σ(θ¯) ∈M(θ¯) for each θ¯ ∈ Θ, which solves
(2.1) in an equilibrium. For m ∈ M , let T (m; σ) := {θ ∈ Θ : σ(θ) = m}, the set of θ for
which the seller reports m according to σ. The equilibrium belief µ is required to follow
Bayes’ rule whenever possible so that Eµ[θ|m] = E[θ|θ ∈ T (m;σ)] if T (m;σ) is nonempty.
Since the pricing rule p(·) and the buyer’s decision rule depend on beliefs, an equilibrium is
p(·) and expectation Eµ[θ|·] are functions of m, and the optimal bidding just follows the expectation of the
quality.
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characterized by simply (σ, µ). In this section, we present necessary conditions for equilibria
regarding certification. We begin by assuming a tie-breaking rule for the choice between
indifferent alternatives.
Assumption 1. Given µ, if Eµ[θ|m]− c(m) = Eµ[θ|m′]− c(m′) and c(m) < c(m′), then the
seller prefers to choose m rather than m′.
If alternatives are indifferent to the seller given a buyer’s belief, she prefers to choose
one with the lowest cost. Thus, given a certification strategy, if deviation to a less costly
certificate gives at least the same profit to the seller as she follows the strategy, then the seller
deviates. The results do not change even if it is assumed that the seller chooses one with
the highest cost. With this assumption, we simply exclude mixed strategies of certification.
Lemma 3. For any equilibrium strategy σ, T (m;σ) is a subinterval in Θ for all m ∈M .
Proof. If T (m;σ) is an empty set or a singleton, it is an interval by definition. Suppose that
θ1, θ2 ∈ T (m; σ) and θ1 < θ2. Since σ is an equilibrium strategy, it must be that for θ2,
Eµ[θ|m]− c(m) ≥ Eµ[θ|m′]− c(m′) (2.2)
for all m′ ∈ M(θ2) (the inequality is strict for m′ < m by Assumption 1). Then, for any
θ′ ∈ (θ1, θ2), (2.2) still holds for all m′ ∈ M(θ′) because m ∈ M(θ′) and M(θ′) ⊂ M(θ2).
Thus, θ′ ∈ T (m;σ).
In any equilibria, T (m;σ) has the minimum if it is nonempty. Let θˆ = inf T (m;σ).
Intuitively, due to the convexity of T (m;σ), by reporting m, θˆ gets the buyer to believe that
the quality is at least θˆ, but with any other available m′ to θˆ, the buyer believes that the
quality is at most θˆ. Thus, θˆ should be in T (m; σ). If T (m;σ) does not have its minimum,
this implies that θˆ is (weakly) better off with some other m′ rather than m. Then, that
means all θ ∈ T (m;σ) are (weakly) better off with m′, which is available to all θ ∈ T (m;σ).
Thus, σ does not constitute an equilibrium. Moreover, m must be the minimum quality of
T (m;σ) in equilibria with Assumption 1.
Lemma 4. Suppose that σ constitutes an equilibrium and T (m;σ) is nonempty for m ∈M .
Then, min T (m; σ) = m.
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Proof. Let θˆ = min T (m;σ), then m ≤ θˆ. Since σ constitutes an equilibrium, for θˆ, (2.2)
must hold for all m′ ∈M(θˆ) (the inequality is strict for m′ < m by Assumption 1). If m < θˆ,
then any θ′ ∈ [m, θˆ) (weakly) profitably deviates tom becausem ∈M(θ′) andM(θ′) ⊂M(θˆ)
so that (2.2) still holds for all m′ ∈M(θ′). Thus, m must be equal to θˆ because then m = θˆ
is unavailable to θ < θˆ.
Lemma 4 implies that in order for the seller to make the buyer believe that the quality is
at least the true quality, she must certify it, which the lower quality sellers cannot pretend.
In other words, the seller of quality θ must report m = θ if she wants to distinguish herself
from the lower quality sellers. We can identify this fact in Example 4. Furthermore, for
θ in any separating segment of qualities, it must be that σ(θ) = θ. From the above two
lemmas, we know that any equilibrium strategy σ(·) is monotone. It is nondecreasing and,
consequently, equilibrium prices p(σ(·)) = Eµ[θ|σ(·)] are also nondecreasing in quality level.
Thus the seller of higher quality never charges a lower price.
2.5 FULL REVELATION
Obviously, if the marginal benefit from more disclosure (a better certificate) is greater than
the marginal cost, then the seller discloses more. Thus, if it is true for all available m, then
full revelation occurs. There are infinitely many separating strategies in a signaling model
with a continuum of messages. In this model, any strictly increasing function σ(·) with
0 ≤ σ(θ) ≤ θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1] is a separating strategy. However, Lemma 4 implies that the
only candidate of separating strategies for an equilibrium is σ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 6. There exists a fully revealing equilibrium if and only if c′(m) < 1 for all
m ∈ [0, 1], where σ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Given µ and p(·) = Eµ[θ|·], the buyer always purchases the product, and thus for each
θ¯ ∈ [0, 1], σ(θ¯) must solve (2.1). By Lemma 4, if an equilibrium is fully revealing, it must be
that σ(θ¯) = θ¯ for all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. With this strategy, Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)] = θ¯ and c(σ(θ¯)) = c(θ¯) for all
θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, in order for the fully revealing strategy to be optimal, it must be that for
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all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1] and for all θ′ ∈ [0, θ¯), θ¯ − c(θ¯) > θ′ − c(θ′), or
c(θ¯)− c(θ′)
θ¯ − θ′ < 1.
This is equivalent to that c′(m) < 1 for all m ∈ [0, 1], and the inequality is strict by
Assumption 1.
The seller is willing to certify some information if the seller can get a higher price than
the certification cost by doing so. If the seller reveals the true value of the product quality,
the price will be charged at the true value because it is assumed that the quality level is
equal to the buyer’s valuation on the product. Thus, if the quality difference between any
two types of the product is greater than the difference in the costs between two certificates
which respectively guarantee the true quality of each type, then for any quality level the
seller has an incentive to certify that the quality is at least the true value. As a result,
full revelation can be supported as an equilibrium outcome as long as the marginal costs of
certification are sufficiently low.
2.6 NO REVELATION
Now we find a no-revelation condition, under which for all θ ∈ Θ the seller reports m = 0
at zero cost. For the non-revealing equilibrium, we must specify the buyer’s posterior beliefs
off the equilibrium path, that is, the beliefs conditional on each certificate m ∈ (0, 1]. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that given a strategy of certification, the buyer update
his belief by Bayes’ rule after observing a certificate. However, Bayes’ rule is not defined for
certificates the seller does not report under the strategy. One conceivable out-of-equilibrium
inference of the buyer is by skepticism. That is, Eµ[θ|m] = m for any certificate m off the
equilibrium path.
Assumption 2. Given σ, if T (m;σ) = ∅ for m ∈M , then Eµ[θ|m] = m.
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For a certificate off the equilibrium path, the buyer believes that with probability 1 the
quality is the possible minimum value the certificate guarantees. This assumption seems to
be arbitrary because the seller of higher quality product would report a better certificate
to get a higher price only if the benefit from doing so covered the increase in the cost.6
However, from the buyer’s perspective, the skeptical inference is beneficial to him because it
would lower the price. Moreover, this assumption is supported by the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that (σ, µ) is an equilibrium for some µ. Then, there exists an equilib-
rium (σ, µ′) where Eµ′ [θ|m] = m for m ∈M such that T (m; σ) = ∅.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium (σ, µ). Then, for all θ¯ ∈ Θ and for any out-of-equilibrium
m ∈ M(θ¯), Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)] − c(σ(θ¯)) ≥ Eµ[θ|m] − c(m) (the inequality is strict for m < σ(θ¯)
by Assumption 1). With the same certification strategy, σ, Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)] = Eµ′ [θ|σ(θ¯)] but
Eµ[θ|m] ≥ Eµ′ [θ|m]. Thus, (σ, µ′) is also an equilibrium.
If there exists an equilibrium, then there also exists an outcome-equivalent equilibrium
with the skeptical belief off the equilibrium path. Thus, to find the necessary and sufficient
condition for a specific equilibrium outcome, we can assume innocuously that the buyer is
skeptical off the equilibrium path because any equilibrium outcome can be supported by
such a belief system.
For the non-revealing equilibrium, if the seller reports certificate m = 0 regardless of the
quality, then the buyer believes that the quality should bem′ if he observedm′ ∈ (0, 1]. With
this belief system off the equilibrium path, we have the following no-revelation condition.
Proposition 7. There exists a non-revealing equilibrium if and only if for all m ∈ [0, 1],
E[θ] ≥ m− c(m), (2.3)
where σ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
The following lemma is convenient to check equilibria with a pooling segment of qualities.
We shall use it to prove Proposition 7.
6Cho and Kreps’ [8] Intuitive Criterion or D1 places no restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs in this
model. However, without certification costs, the skeptical belief is the only one that passes the Intuitive
Criterion.
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Lemma 6. Given σ, if for some θ ∈ T (m;σ), σ(θ) is incentive compatible, then for all
θ′ ∈ T (m; σ) with θ′ < θ, so is σ(θ′).
Proof. This follows from the facts that the seller’s profit does not depend on the value of θ
directly so every θ ∈ T (m; σ) makes the same profit and thatM(θ′) ⊂M(θ) for any θ′, θ ∈ Θ
with θ′ < θ.
Proof of Proposition 7. The only completely pooling strategy in the model is that σ(θ) = 0
for all θ ∈ Θ. Given the certification strategy, the buyer’s conditional expectation on the
quality is Eµ[θ|m = 0] = E[θ] associated with the prior distribution and Eµ[θ|m] = m for
m ∈ (0, 1] with the skeptical beliefs. For the specified strategy to be optimal, it is enough
that σ(θ¯) solves (2.1) for θ¯ = 1, that is,
Eµ[θ|0]− c(0) ≥ Eµ[θ|m]− c(m)
for all m ∈ (0, 1] because then, by Lemma 6, σ(θ¯) is incentive compatible for all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1) as
well. For m = 0, (2.3) holds trivially.
Corollary 2. Suppose that a fully revealing equilibrium exists. Then, there exists a non-
revealing equilibrium if and only if E[θ] ≥ 1− c(1).
Proof. If there exists a fully revealing equilibrium, m− c(m) is increasing in m and reaches
the maximum when m = 1 because c′(m) < 1 for all m ∈ [0, 1] by Proposition 6. Then, by
Proposition 7, a non-revealing equilibrium exists if and only if (2.3) holds for m = 1.
If the average quality, which is equal to the price when the seller does not certify any
information, is greater than the benefit from any revelation net of the cost, then there exists
another equilibrium in which the seller just conceals the private information altogether.
Thus, if either high qualities are common in the industry or the certification cost is sufficiently
high, then no-revelation can be supported as an equilibrium. The former case is similar to
Harbaugh and To [18] in which no-revelation is an equilibrium even without disclosure cost
when good news is common.
Corollary 2 depicts the situation in which both a fully revealing equilibrium and a non-
revealing equilibrium exist, where the average quality is greater than the profit of the highest
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quality seller from revelation. Besides the fully revealing equilibrium and the non-revealing
equilibrium, there may exist other equilibria in between. A simple example with three
qualities is presented below.
Example 4. Consider a three-quality example. Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, where θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2,
θ3 = 3, which are uniformly distributed. Let M = {m1,m2,m3}, where m1 = {θ1, θ2, θ3},
m2 = {θ2, θ3}, m3 = {θ3}, and let c(m1) = 0, c(m2) = 0.6, c(m3) = 1.2. In this example,
there are four (pure strategy) equilibria including both a fully revealing equilibrium and a
non-revealing equilibrium. The certification strategies constituting the other two partially
revealing equilibria are

σ(θ1) = m1
σ(θ2) = m1
σ(θ3) = m3
and

σ(θ1) = m1
σ(θ2) = m2
σ(θ3) = m2
respectively. Notice that in all equilibria, if θi is separating from θi−1, σ(θi) = mi as Lemma
4 states.
2.7 WELFARE ASPECTS
In this model, the buyer does not care about which equilibrium should be realized because
his entire surplus is extracted by the seller in any cases. From the seller’s perspective, full
concealment is the best equilibrium and full revelation is the worst because the revelation
incurs a cost.
Let pi(θ) and u(θ) be the equilibrium profit and utility respectively when the quality is
θ, and let Epi and Eu be the ex ante equilibrium payoffs. In any equilibrium (σ, µ), the
product is always traded at the price equal to the buyer’s expectation on the quality. Thus,
for each θ¯ ∈ [0, 1],
pi(θ¯) = Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)]− c(σ(θ¯)) and u(θ¯) = θ¯ − Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)];
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and with the prior belief F on θ,
Epi =
∫ 1
0
pi(θ) dF (θ) and Eu =
∫ 1
0
u(θ) dF (θ).
Eu = 0 in any equilibria, where the monopoly seller extracts the buyer’s entire expected net
benefit.
In order to compare equilibria, first suppose that both a fully revealing equilibrium and
a non-revealing equilibrium exist and note that (2.3) holds for all m ∈ [0, 1]. In the fully
revealing equilibrium, σ(θ¯) = θ¯ and Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)] = θ¯ for all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, for all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1],
pi(θ¯) = θ¯ − c(θ¯) and u(θ¯) = 0.
In the non-revealing equilibrium, σ(θ¯) = 0 and Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)] = E[θ] for all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, for
all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1],
pi(θ¯) = E[θ] and u(θ¯) = θ¯ − E[θ].
For any quality level, the non-revealing equilibrium is better than the fully revealing
equilibrium for the seller by (2.3), and therefore this is also true at the ex ante stage. Since
at most the seller of θ = 1 is indifferent between them, the seller strictly ex ante prefers the
non-revealing equilibrium to the fully revealing equilibrium. The private information itself
is not valuable to the seller and the certification is costly, which makes the seller prefer the
concealment to the revelation. This is another corollary of Proposition 7.
Corollary 3. Suppose that there exist both a fully revealing equilibrium and a non-revealing
equilibrium. Then, for all θ ∈ Θ the non-revealing equilibrium gives at least as high profit to
the seller as the fully revealing equilibrium for any distribution F supporting the non-revealing
equilibrium. At most the seller of θ = 1 is indifferent between them.
Proof. For all θ¯ ∈ [0, 1], pi(θ¯) = E[θ] in the non-revealing equilibrium and pi(θ¯) = θ¯− c(θ¯) in
the fully revealing equilibrium, and we know by Proposition 7 that E[θ] ≥ θ¯ − c(θ¯) for all
θ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Since, by Proposition 6, the RHS is increasing in θ¯, the equality is possible only
for θ¯ = 1.
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Table 2.1: The equilibrium payoffs in Example 4
σ (m1,m1,m1) (m1,m1,m3) (m1,m2,m2) (m1,m2,m3)
pi(θ) (2, 2, 2) (1.5, 1.5, 1.8) (1, 1.9, 1.9) (1, 1.4, 1.8)
u(θ) (−1, 0, 1) (−0.5, 0.5, 0) (0,−0.5, 0.5) (0, 0, 0)
Epi 2 1.6 1.6 1.4
Eu 0 0 0 0
In the non-revealing equilibrium, the seller’s profit equals the average quality regardless
of the quality levels. Given the non-revealing certification strategy, any other certificate
than m = 0 is not profitable and the deviation gives at most full revelation profit with
the skeptical buyer off the equilibrium path. This is true for any quality level because the
quality itself is valueless to the seller. Thus, the seller makes higher profit by concealing the
information rather than revealing. For the buyer, the non-revealing equilibrium is better
with high qualities above the average whereas the fully revealing equilibrium is better with
low qualities. However, at the ex ante stage, any equilibria are indifferent to the buyer
because the expected utility is always zero by the monopolist’s pricing rule.
Table 2.1 shows both the ex post and ex ante payoffs for all equilibria in Example 4. In
this example with three qualities, there exist four (pure strategy) equilibria: a fully revealing
equilibrium, a non-revealing equilibrium, and two partially revealing equilibria. As the table
shows, for all quality levels, the non-revealing equilibrium with the certification strategy
(m1,m1,m1) gives the highest profit to the seller and the fully revealing equilibrium with
(m1,m2,m3) gives the lowest profit among all equilibria.
The non-revealing equilibrium is socially optimal if it exists, when it is evaluated at the
ex ante stage. Since the monopoly seller extracts the surplus from the buyer, the buyer’s
benefit from revelation only transfers to the seller. At the ex ante stage, the amount of the
benefit is the same as the average quality over all equilibria but the revelation incurs a social
cost.
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Proposition 8. An equilibrium (σ, µ) is ex ante Pareto efficient if σ minimizes
∫ 1
0
c(σ(θ)) dF (θ) (2.4)
over the set of equilibria.
Proof. Since
∫ 1
0
Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)] dF (θ¯) = E[θ], the ex ante payoffs are calculated as Epi = E[θ]−∫ 1
0
c(σ(θ)) dF (θ) for a given equilibrium strategy σ and Eu = 0 for any equilibria. Thus,
only Epi varies over equilibria and efficient σ minimizes (2.4).
Corollary 4. Suppose that there exists a non-revealing equilibrium. Then, it ex ante Pareto
dominates any other equilibria.
Proof. (2.4) is zero for the non-revealing equilibrium and otherwise it is strictly positive.
Hence, the non-revealing equilibrium is ex ante Pareto efficient.
The social welfare can be measured by Epi because Eu = 0 in any equilibria. The
revelation cost is calculated at the ex ante stage as (2.4), which is the welfare loss caused
by certification. Since the seller’s expected revenue is E[θ] whatever the strategy is, the
social welfare is only affected by the revelation cost and the equilibrium with the least cost
is socially optimal. Note that (2.4) is largest when information is fully revealed and it is
zero when no information is revealed. Thus, when certification is costly, full revelation of the
product quality is the worst and full concealment is the best for the market if they are both
an equilibrium. This result is in the stream of the existing literature on costly disclosure such
as Jovanovic [23] and Cheong and Kim [7]. They show that equilibrium level of information
disclosure is socially excessive when disclosure is costly.7
However, disclosure laws can reduce the buyer’s risk of the purchase at the expense of
the seller’s profits. The buyer’s expected utility is zero in any equilibria but the risk from
purchase is different over the equilibria. Although the non-revealing equilibrium is the best,
it is risky to the buyer because no information is revealed and the same price is charged for
7However, they propose different policies to prevent the excessive disclosure. Jovanovic [23] argues that
the inefficiency can be eliminated by a subsidy to sale without disclosure and a tax on disclosure is an inferior
policy, whereas Cheong and Kim [7] are in favor of taxation on disclosure.
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all quality levels. Hence, the buyer gets negative utility with some positive probability. On
the other hand, full revelation gives him zero utility for certain.
Alternatively, we might think about warranties in this model. Consider again Example 4
and see Table 2.1 for the equilibrium payoffs. If the seller gives a warranty to the buyer that
covers buyer’s ex post negative utility, then in the non-revealing equilibrium the equilibrium
payoffs for each quality are
pi(θ1) = 1, pi(θ2) = 2, pi(θ3) = 2,
u(θ1) = 0, u(θ2) = 0, u(θ3) = 1.
Thus, the non-revealing equilibrium is the best ex ante for both the seller and the buyer.
Instead of disclosure laws, forcing sellers to make warranties increases consumers’ welfare
without welfare loss caused by the revelation cost. However, in food or health industry,
disclosure laws might be more appropriate than ex post warranties to protect consumers.
2.8 EFFECTIVE USE OF THE PRODUCT
So far, a market for a product with uncertain quality has been analyzed, in which the buyer
is only concerned about the quality. However, when the buyer is more informed of the
quality, he can use or maintain the product more effectively and reduce welfare loss from an
inappropriate use. In this section, by modifying the buyer’s utility function, we analyze a
market where buyer’s effective use of the product matters.
Now suppose that if the buyer purchases the product, he takes an action a ∈ R on it
and gets utility
u = θ − (a− θ)2 − p. (2.5)
As in the benchmark, the quality θ itself gives a value to the buyer, which is the first term
of the utility function. In addition, the utility depends on how effectively the buyer uses
and maintains the product, which we call the buyer’s action. The optimal action is different
across the quality levels. Even though the product is of high quality, inappropriate use may
do harm to the consumers like medicine and food for diet. A low quality car user should have
38
the car inspected more often. Only buyers who have received full information of the product
can use it most effectively. This is shown by the second term, the quadratic loss form. When
the effectiveness of use matters, the seller is more willing to reveal the product information.
Furthermore, more information is revealed as the variance of the uncertain quality is larger
because the buyer becomes more cautious about the risky consumption.
Since the buyer’s expectation on the quality is Eµ[θ|m] with belief µ on observing m, his
best action given m after he purchases the product is a(m) = Eµ[θ|m]. Given m, p, and the
best action function a(·), the buyer’s expected utility from purchase is derived as
Eµ[u|m] = Eµ[θ|m]− Varµ(θ|m)− p.
Thus, the expected utility now additionally depends on the variance of the quality conditional
on a certificate. By adding the effectiveness of use into the model, the uncertain product
quality lowers the buyer’s expected utility. Therefore, the seller charges a lower price than
she would in the case in which effective use does not matter. Formally, the seller’s pricing
rule after reporting a certificate m is p(m) = Eµ[θ|m]−Varµ(θ|m).8 Then, in an equilibrium,
for all θ¯ ∈ Θ, σ(θ¯) solves
max
m∈M(θ¯)
Eµ[θ|m]− Varµ(θ|m)− c(m).
Note that all the previous lemmas hold with the modified utility function. Thus, the
full revelation condition is the same as in Proposition 6, that is, c′(m) < 1 for all m ∈ [0, 1]
because Varµ(θ|m) = 0 for any m ∈ M with the certification strategy σ(θ) = θ for all
θ ∈ Θ. However, no-revelation condition is slightly different. First, we should specify out-of-
equilibrium beliefs, but the fact that Lemma 5 still holds in this version implies that we can
just assume the buyer is skeptical off the equilibrium path. This is because any equilibrium
outcome can be supported by such a belief system. The following is the lemma for this
version.
8If for some m, Eµ[θ|m] < Varµ(θ|m), then the market might fail for the product whose seller reported m
because the buyer’s expected utility would be negative for any price. However, with the set of qualities [0, 1],
we can safely avoid the market failure. Since θ ≥ θ2 for θ ∈ [0, 1], E[θ] ≥ E[θ2] for any distribution on any
subset of [0, 1]. Thus, E[θ] ≥ E[θ2]− (E[θ])2 (the inequality is strict unless θ = 0 with probability 1), where
the right-hand side is another expression of Var(θ). Therefore, for any µ and any m, Eµ[θ|m] ≥ Varµ(θ|m)
and the market never fails.
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Lemma 7. Suppose that the utility function is given as (2.5) and (σ, µ) is an equilibrium
for some µ. Then, there exists an equilibrium (σ, µ′) where Eµ′ [θ|m] = m for m ∈ M such
that T (m;σ) = ∅.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium (σ, µ). Then, for all θ¯ ∈ Θ and for any out-of-equilibrium
m ∈M(θ¯),
Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)]− Varµ(θ|σ(θ¯))− c(σ(θ¯)) ≥ Eµ[θ|m]− Varµ(θ|m)− c(m),
where the inequality is strict form < σ(θ¯) by Assumption 1. Since with the same certification
strategy, σ,
Eµ[θ|σ(θ¯)]− Varµ(θ|σ(θ¯)) = Eµ′ [θ|σ(θ¯)]− Varµ′(θ|σ(θ¯)),
(σ, µ′) is an equilibrium if
Eµ[θ|m]− Varµ(θ|m)− c(m) ≥ Eµ′ [θ|m]− c(m).
Since Eµ′ [θ|m] = m, we want to show that Eµ[θ|m]−Varµ(θ|m) ≥ m. Let a random variable
x = θ − m. Then, Eµ[x|m] = Eµ[θ|m] − m and Varµ(x|m) = Varµ(θ|m). Following the
argument in footnote 8, Eµ[x|m] ≥ Varµ(x|m) because x is distributed over a subset of [0, 1].
This completes the proof.
Now the no-revelation condition follows as Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. Suppose that the utility function is given as (2.5). Then, there exists a
non-revealing equilibrium if and only if for all m ∈ [0, 1],
E[θ]− Var(θ) ≥ m− c(m), (2.6)
where σ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Following the certification strategy, σ(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, the seller’s profit is
E[θ]−Var(θ), and by deviating to m ∈ (0, 1] if it is available, the profit is m− c(m) with the
buyer’s skeptical beliefs. For the specified strategy to be optimal, by Lemma 6, it is enough
that σ(θ) is incentive compatible for θ = 1. Hence, we need E[θ] − Var(θ) ≥ m − c(m) for
all m ∈ (0, 1]. For m = 0, the inequality holds trivially.
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Figure 2.1: No-revelation condition
Since the least revelation (the least cost equilibrium) ex ante Pareto dominates any
other equilibria, Propositions 7 and 9 provoke the comparison of the amount of information
revealed between the two environments. In order to compare the no-revelation conditions
between the original model and the modified model, we rearrange the terms in conditions
(2.3) and (2.6) for the cost function as c(m) ≥ m − E[θ] and c(m) ≥ m − E[θ] + Var(θ)
respectively. In Figure 2.1, the line of m−E[θ]+Var(θ) should be located between m−E[θ]
and 45◦ line because E[θ] > Var(θ) > 0 for any distribution F . For the existence of a
non-revealing equilibrium, the cost function should be located above the line of m − E[θ]
in the original model and above the line of m − E[θ] + Var(θ) in the modified model. This
implies that given a cost function, the seller is more willing to reveal the quality when the
effectiveness of use matters.
In the figure, there exists a non-revealing equilibrium, which is socially optimal, when
the utility depends on product quality alone, while there should be at least some degree
of revelation when effective use matters to the buyer. Furthermore, as the variance of the
quality is larger or as the average quality is lower, more information is revealed in the optimal
equilibrium. The uncertainty increases the probability that the buyer deals with the product
ineffectively and lowers the price by the variance of the quality. Therefore, as the variance
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is larger, the seller is more willing to reveal the information in order to raise the price.
2.9 CONCLUSION
One of the factors of the failure of full revelation is the existence of certification cost. Only if
the marginal benefit from certification is greater than the marginal cost, full revelation can
be supported as an equilibrium outcome. In this chapter, the buyer is uncertain of product
quality and the seller certifies the quality at a cost. The quality is relevant to the buyer’s
utility and the buyer decides if he will purchase the product at a price the seller charges. By
the assumption that the seller is a monopolist, the buyer always purchases the product and
the seller extracts the entire surplus from the buyer. With the monopolist model, we remove
allocative distortion caused by a certification cost and only focus on the informational issue.
The existence of a fully revealing equilibrium depends on the cost structure of certifica-
tion. In this model, the certification cost is increasing in the sense that a better certificate
is more costly. The seller can charge a higher price if she can persuade the buyer that the
product is of good quality. Thus, if the marginal benefit from certification is greater than
the marginal cost, that is, if the seller can charge a sufficiently high price relative to the
certification cost, then the seller certifies information and discloses it to the buyer. How-
ever, full revelation of information is the worst equilibrium because of the certification cost
whereas full concealment is the best if it exists. Full concealment occurs when the average
quality or certification cost is sufficiently high. In general, there are multiple equilibria and
the equilibrium with the least revelation is ex ante Pareto optimal. This is because the
private information itself is valueless to the seller and the revelation only incurs a cost.
If the buyer is concerned about his action as well as the product quality, the seller has
more incentive to reveal the quality even if the certification cost is high. As the buyer is
more informed, he can deal with the product more effectively. If we incorporate this fact into
the model, more information is revealed in the optimal equilibrium as compared with the
case in which the buyer is only concerned about the quality. Furthermore, more information
is revealed as the variance of the quality is larger or as the average quality is lower. Since
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the buyer is uncertain of the quality, the price falls by the variance because of the risky
consumption. Therefore, the seller is more willing to reveal the private information in order
to raise the price.
We could define the set of all possible qualities as any compact interval in R. By allowing
for negative qualities, we can analyze a market for a product that is undesirable to the buyer
with a positive probability, for example, cigarettes, medicine, food, etc. They may do harm
to the consumers by side effects or food poisoning. In this case, it is conceivable that the
seller tends to conceal the information and the role of disclosure laws is more important.
Some other issues remain for further work. In this chapter, we analyzed the model with
an increasing cost function of certification without further assumptions. However, the cost
structure varies over industries: convex or concave functions, high or low marginal costs.
The characterization of equilibria depending on cost structures will make possible cross-
industry comparison. Also, the model can be extended by introducing heterogeneous buyers
or competition among multiple sellers.
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3.0 QUALITY DISCLOSURE AND COMPARATIVE ADVERTISEMENT
3.1 INTRODUCTION
We study firms’ voluntary disclosure in an oligopoly market for differentiated products,
where firms are allowed to advertise a rival’s product as well as their own product. When
consumers are uncertain of product qualities, Board [6] and Hotz and Xiao [19] show that
price competition among firms alleviates firms’ incentives to disclose the quality of their own
product. However, firms also have incentives to distinguish their own product from others to
attract more consumers. A comparative advertisement is a useful way to distinguish products
and thus, a rival’s advertisement can lead to a disclosure of a firm’s product information.
Comparative or negative advertisements are used in many industries and political cam-
paigns. In the advertisement of the mobile phone 3G network service on the TV commercial
and their Internet website, Verizon Wireless compare the service coverage with that of their
competitor, AT&T.1 They have a broader service area than AT&T and use a comparative
advertisement to show that their service is superior. Through the negative advertisement
by Verizon Wireless on the AT&T’s service, the information on the AT&T’s mobile phone
service is revealed even though AT&T do not disclose their nation-wide service coverage in
a picture. This contrasts with that AT&T show the map of their nation-wide 3G service
coverage of iPad.2
This chapter allows firms to advertise a rival’s product. We show that the qualities of
1See the map at http://vzwmap.verizonwireless.com/dotcom/coveragelocator/images/maps/3Gcompari-
son.pdf. “3G takes raw, untamed signal and adds an extra, turbo-charged boost. It helps you transmit
and receive impressively fast, with average download speeds ranging from 600Kbps to 1.4Mbps” (http://
phones.verizonwireless.com/3g/).
2See the map at http://www.wireless.att.com/coverageviewer/.
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all the products in a market are fully revealed by a high quality firm’s comparative adver-
tisement and full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome. Each firm’s advertisement
(message) can convey information on either its own product quality or a rival’s or both. Other
than traditional models that consider advertisement as signaling product qualities (Nelson
[37], Schmalensee [42], Grossman and Shapiro [17], and Kihlstrom and Riordan [24]), we
consider it as a truthful claim about qualities. That is, it conveys information directly to
the consumers. The restriction of firms’ messages to truthful claims can be justified by the
argument that an untruthful claim, such as an overstatement on their own product or an
understatement on their rival’s product, could be challenged in a court of law. If the claim
was found to be untruthful, the firm that sent the untrue message might have to pay a fine
or worse, and the true quality would be revealed as the result.
In this model, full revelation occurs as the unique equilibrium outcome. If firms disclose
no information and consumers do not distinguish the qualities among products, then the
firms’ profits are zero by price competition. By revealing some information and having
consumers perceive that the product is differentiated from a rival’s, the firms can increase
the profits. With two firms, full information on all products is revealed by the high quality
firm as in the above example. First, comparing the products between the firms is good for
the high quality firm because then it can attract more consumers. Thus, the high quality
firm can increase the profit by advertising the rival’s low quality product negatively. Since
lying is not allowed, the true quality of the rival’s product is revealed. Additionally, the
high quality firm reveals the true quality of its own product to get a high price. Since the
advertisement that fully reveals both firms’ product qualities is a dominant strategy for the
high quality firm, full revelation is the unique outcome.
In general, full revelation fails without advertisement on a rival’s product. However,
literature shows that full revelation increases consumers’ welfare, and so argues in favor
of the introduction of mandatory disclosure laws (Fishman and Hagerty [12], Board [6],
and Hotz and Xiao [19]). The results of this chapter imply that a market can lead to full
revelation with voluntary disclosure by allowing for negative advertisement on rivals’ product
instead of mandatory disclosure laws which entail an enforcement cost and a deadweight loss.
Also, negative advertisement plays a role in a political campaign because full revelation of
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candidates’ information is a very important issue. Therefore, although there is a debate,
recent studies such as Polborn and Yi [41] are in favor of prevailing negative campaigning to
facilitate a more informed choice by the electorate.
Lipman and Seppi [30] analyze a similar but different model in which informed senders
have conflicting preferences among them. The senders sequentially move and each of them
sends either a cheap talk message or a partially provable message which excludes some states
of nature. They show that full revelation occurs because conflicting preferences guarantee
that someone will have an incentive to correct any mistaken inference.
There are other competition models in which the informed parties can only disclose their
own information. Ivanov [20] shows that informed sellers’ information can be fully revealed
in a sufficiently competitive market if each seller’s message is privately observed by the
consumer. However, full revelation does not guarantee the full market efficiency. Levin et al.
[27] and Cheong and Kim [7] analyze the effect of price competition of firms on the incentive
to disclose quality when the disclosure is costly. In Levin et al. [27], disclosure level is higher
under a monopoly cartel than under duopoly. Furthermore, Cheong and Kim [7] argue that
firms tend to conceal their private information as the number of competing firms becomes
larger even though the disclosure cost is very low.
All the above models study information transmission from the informed party to the
uninformed party. On the other hand, there is literature that studies information sharing
among competitors. Jansen [22] shows that if innovation is not protected by intellectual
property rights and the imitation of the technology is costless, at most one firm reveals
some of its technologies. Gill [13] analyzes the incentives to disclose intermediate research
results in an R&D competition. The leading innovator’s disclosure may help the follower
by knowledge spillovers. However, the leader may disclose the results in order to signal
commitment to the project and induce the rival to exit the competition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present an oligopoly
model with price competition between two firms and derive the firms’ profit functions from
the equilibrium pricing rules and the associated demand functions. With the profit functions,
in Section 3.3, we analyze the firms’ advertisement strategies and show that full information is
revealed by the high quality firm. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter by discussing extendible
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issues.
3.2 MODEL
We follow a general setting for a differentiated product market. Two firms, 1 and 2, compete
in prices with product qualities uncertain to a continuum of consumers. The quality of
firm i’s (i = 1, 2) product is θi, which is drawn from [0, 1] according to a distribution F
independently. Each firm knows the qualities of both its own product and the rival’s product.
The consumers only know the distribution and do not observe the quality until they purchase
it. Assuming that the production cost is zero, the firm i’s profit is pii = piDi, where pi ∈ R+
is the product price of firm i and Di is the demand for i’s product. A consumer can purchase
at most one unit and her utility is given as u = γθi − pi if she purchases a product from
firm i. We denote by γ the degree of strength of consumers’ preference, which is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. The reservation utility is assumed to be zero.
Before the firms compete in prices, each of them can advertise both on its own product
and on the rival’s product. We denote firm i’s advertisement by a message mi = (mi1,mi2),
where mij ∈ P([0, 1]) is firm i’s message on firm j’s product. Messages are restricted to
be truthful so that mij must contain the true value of θj or otherwise it is empty. The
firms simultaneously choose messages. Let µ be consumers’ belief on the qualities, then the
consumers’ expectation on the quality of the firm i’s product associated with µ is Eµ[θi|m]
after observing m = (m1,m2).
In order to analyze advertisement strategies, we first derive the demand function and the
optimal pricing rule for each firm. Since it is a zero probability event that θ1 = θ2, we assume
θ1 < θ2 without loss of generality. Also, we exclude the case that Eµ[θ1|m] = Eµ[θ2|m]
because then, by price competition, each firm’s profit goes down to zero, which is not in an
equilibrium. Given m, a consumer with γ purchases firm 2’s product if
γEµ[θ2|m]− p2 ≥ γEµ[θ1|m]− p1
⇒ γ ≥ p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] ;
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and she purchases firm 1’s product if
γEµ[θ1|m]− p1 ≥ 0 and γEµ[θ1|m]− p1 > γEµ[θ2|m]− p2
⇒ p1
Eµ[θ1|m] ≤ γ <
p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] .
Thus, the demand functions are derived as
D1(p1, p2) = Prob
(
p1
Eµ[θ1|m] ≤ γ <
p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m]
)
=
p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] −
p1
Eµ[θ1|m]
and
D2(p1, p2) = Prob
(
γ ≥ p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m]
)
= 1− p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] .
In deriving the demand functions, we assumed implicitly
0 ≤ p1
Eµ[θ1|m] ≤
p2 − p1
Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] ≤ 1.
Otherwise, at least one firm’s demand would be zero and give zero profit to the firm, which
does not occur in equilibrium. With the demand functions, each firm’s equilibrium pricing
rule is uniquely determined as
p1(m) =
Eµ[θ1|m](Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])
4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] ,
p2(m) =
2Eµ[θ2|m](Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])
4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m] ,
and the firms’ profit functions under the pricing rules are derived as
pi1(p1(m), p2(m)) =
Eµ[θ1|m]Eµ[θ2|m](Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])
(4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])2 ,
pi2(p1(m), p2(m)) =
4(Eµ[θ2|m])2(Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])
(4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])2 .
Since profits are nonnegative, it must be that Eµ[θ2|m] > Eµ[θ1|m] and p2(m) > p1(m) in
equilibrium. Then, we can now analyze the firms’ strategies on advertisement by considering
the profit functions.
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3.3 ADVERTISEMENT STRATEGIES
Profits depend on the consumers’ expectation on qualities. If the firms reveal nothing, this
advertisement strategy is not an equilibrium because p1 = p2 = 0 and pi1 = pi2 = 0 by price
competition. Revealing information in a market for differentiated products reduces the price
competition between firms and increases the profits.
First, consider the low quality firm 1. Given the consumers’ expectation on θ2, consider
how the profit of firm 1 varies with the expectation on θ1. We can derive the partial derivative
as
∂pi1(p1(m), p2(m))
∂Eµ[θ1|m] =
(Eµ[θ2|m])2(4Eµ[θ2|m]− 7Eµ[θ1|m])
(4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])3 .
The sign of the derivative depends on the expectations on the qualities and this implies that
firm 1’s advertisement on its own product is strategic as long as firm 2 does not reveal θ1.
This is shown in Board [6]. On the other hand, the partial derivative with respect to the
expectation on θ2 is
∂pi1(p1(m), p2(m))
∂Eµ[θ2|m] =
(Eµ[θ1|m])2(Eµ[θ1|m] + 2Eµ[θ2|m])
(4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])3 > 0.
Thus, firm 1 has an incentive to reveal the rival’s high quality because the profit of firm
1 is increasing in the expectation on the rival’s product quality. However, the low quality
firm’s advertisement has no effects on the outcome because all information on the both firms’
products is revealed by the high quality firm.
Proposition 10. Let θ1 < θ2. Then, θ1 and θ2 are revealed by firm 2 in equilibrium and full
revelation is the unique outcome.
The proposition is confirmed by considering the profit function of the high quality firm
2. The partial derivatives of the function with respect to the consumers’ expectations are
∂pi2(p1(m), p2(m))
∂Eµ[θ1|m] = −
4(Eµ[θ2|m])2(2Eµ[θ2|m] + Eµ[θ1|m])
(4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])3 < 0
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and
∂pi2(p1(m), p2(m))
∂Eµ[θ2|m] =
4Eµ[θ2|m](4(Eµ[θ2|m])2 − 3Eµ[θ1|m]Eµ[θ2|m] + 2(Eµ[θ1|m])2)
(4Eµ[θ2|m]− Eµ[θ1|m])3 > 0.
The profit of firm 2 is decreasing in the consumers’ expectation on θ1 and increasing in
the expectation on θ2. Thus, firm 2’s best strategy on the rival’s product is the negative
advertisement, which rules out all the higher values than θ1. Then, the consumers rationally
believe that the true quality is the highest value that is not ruled out. Similarly, firm 2’s best
strategy on its own product is to rule out all the lower values than θ2 and the consumers infer
exactly the true quality, which is the lowest value that is not ruled out. Thus, all information
on the products is revealed by the high quality firm’s comparative advertisement.
The firm 2’s advertisement strategies on its own product and the rival’s product that
fully reveal the qualities are dominant strategies because they are the best regardless of firm
1’s strategies. Therefore, full revelation of the uncertain qualities is the unique equilibrium
outcome.
3.4 CONCLUSION
All information is fully revealed by a high quality firm’s comparative advertisement and,
moreover, full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome. However, full revelation fails in
general without negative advertisement in a competitive market. Some studies argue in favor
of the introduction of mandatory disclosure laws because revelation increases consumers’ wel-
fare. This chapter shows that even without mandatory disclosure laws, the market outcome
can lead to full revelation if negative advertisement on rivals’ product is allowed.
The model can be easily extended to an oligopoly with more than two firms. It is
conceivable that full revelation still occurs by the firms’ comparative advertisements. The
highest quality firm will reveal itself and each firm including the highest quality firm will
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advertise negatively the next high quality firm’s product because the firms gain more as the
difference of the qualities is larger.
If firms do not observe rivals’ product qualities, it is probabilistic whether a claim about a
rival’s quality was truthful or not. Thus, we should consider the probability representing the
likelihood of being charged by a court by misreporting the rival’s information. In this case,
the revelation will depend on the cost of misreporting and the joint distribution of qualities.
Recalling the partial derivatives of the profit functions, if a firm’s product is inferior to
the rival’s, then the firm gains more as the rival’s product is perceived more superior. An
overstatement on the rival’s product will not be challenged because it is profitable for the
high quality firm as well. Only the problematic case is a high quality firm’s understatement
on the rival’s product because the low quality firm’s advertisement on its own product is
strategic. We leave this issue for future work.
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APPENDIX
PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 3. For N ≥ 2, consider a partition 〈t0 = 0, t1, . . . , tN = 1〉 such that
mI(t) = mi for t ∈ [ti−1, ti), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and mU = m1. Then, the receiver’s optimal
action rule is:
a1 = φ(m1)
t1
2
+ [1− φ(m1)]1
2
,
ai =
ti−1 + ti
2
, i = 2, 3, . . . , N,
where
φ(m1) =
pt1
pt1 + 1− p.
By the informed sender’s arbitrage conditions, we have
2t1 =
pt1
2 + 1− p
2(pt1 + 1− p) +
t1 + t2
2
− 2b, (.1)
2ti =
ti−1 + ti
2
+
ti + ti+1
2
− 2b, i = 2, 3, . . . , N − 1. (.2)
Solving the difference equation (.2), we get a sequence {t1, t2, . . . , tN = 1} such that
ti = t1 + (t2 − t1)(i− 1) + 2b(i− 1)(i− 2), i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (.3)
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Since tN = 1, by (.3), we get
t2 =
1− 2b(N − 1)(N − 2) + t1(N − 2)
N − 1 . (.4)
We need t1 < t2, and replacing t2 with (.4), we have
t1 < 1− 2b(N − 1)(N − 2). (.5)
Plugging (.4) into (.1) and solving for t1 such that t1 > 0, we get
t1 =
−B +√B2 − 4AC
2A
,
where
A = pN,
B = 2bpN(N − 1)− 2pN + (2N − 1),
C = 2b(1− p)N(N − 1)− (1− p)N.
Hence, we can determine the partition 〈t0 = 0, t1, . . . , tN = 1〉 and mI(·) is the best response
to the action rule.
For the uninformed sender, the incentive compatibility, together with (.5), requires that
1
2
≤ t1 < 1− 2b(N − 1)(N − 2), (.6)
and (.6) holds when
b ≤ 2− pN
4(2− p)N(N − 1) .
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Proof of Proposition 4. For N ≥ 3, consider a partition 〈t0 = 0, t1, . . . , tN = 1〉 such that
mI(t) = mi for t ∈ [ti−1, ti), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and mU = mN . Then, the receiver’s optimal
action rule is:
ai =
ti−1 + ti
2
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1,
aN = φ(mN)
tN−1 + 1
2
+ [1− φ(mN)]1
2
,
where
φ(mN) =
p(1− tN−1)
p(1− tN−1) + 1− p.
By the informed sender’s arbitrage conditions, we have
2ti =
ti−1 + ti
2
+
ti + ti+1
2
− 2b, i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 2, (.7)
2tN−1 =
tN−2 + tN−1
2
+
1− ptN−12
2(1− ptN−1) − 2b. (.8)
Solving the difference equation (.7), we get a sequence {t0 = 0, t1, . . . , tN−1} such that
ti = t1i+ 2bi(i− 1), i = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. (.9)
Take tN−1 and tN−2 from (.9) and solve (.8) for t1 such that tN−1 < 1. We get the solution
as
t1 =
−B −√B2 − 4AC
2A
,
where
A = pN(N − 1),
B = 2bpN(N − 1)(2N − 3)− (2N − 1),
C = 4b2pN(N − 1)2(N − 2)− 4b(N − 1)2 + 1.
If t1 > 0, we can determine the partition 〈t0 = 0, t1, . . . , tN = 1〉 and mI(·) is the best
response to the action rule.
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Now we need the uninformed sender’s incentive compatibility, which requires that tN−1 ≤
1/2. From (.9), tN−1 ≤ 1/2 implies that
t1 ≤ 1− 4b(N − 1)(N − 2)
2(N − 1) , (.10)
and the strictly positive t1 satisfies (.10) when
pN − 2
4(2− p)N(N − 1) ≤ b <
N − 1−√(1− p)N(N − 2) + 1
2pN(N − 1)(N − 2) .
Proof of Proposition 5. In Example 2, we constructed the 3-step equilibrium with mU =
m2 and showed that b¯
3
2(p) =
9−8p
24(3−2p) is greater than b¯
3
CS = 1/12 if p < 3/4.
Suppose that N ≥ 5 and N is an odd number. Let M ≥ 2 be an integer and consider a
partition 〈t0 = 0, t1, . . . , tM , t′0, t′1, . . . , t′M = 1〉 so that N = 2M + 1, where the uninformed
sender pools with [tM , t
′
0), that is, m
U = mM+1. Using the same way as in the above proofs,
by the informed sender’s arbitrage conditions and the receiver’s optimal actions, we have
ti+1 − ti = ti − ti−1 + 4b and t′i+1 − t′i = t′i − t′i−1 + 4b
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1. Solving the two difference equations with t0 = 0 and t′M = 1, we get
t1 =
tM − 2bM(M − 1)
M
and t′1 =
1− 2bM(M − 1) + t′0(M − 1)
M
.
Since 0 < t1 and t
′
0 < t
′
1, we must have 2bM(M − 1) < tM and t′0 < 1 − 2bM(M − 1).
By these two inequalities and the uninformed sender’s incentive compatibility condition, the
specified partition supports an equilibrium if
2bM(M − 1) < tM ≤ 1
2
≤ t′0 < 1− 2bM(M − 1). (.11)
With the help of the arbitrage conditions for t = tM and t = t
′
0, we can solve for tM and t
′
0
as
tM =
4pM2(M + 1)[b(2M + 1)− 1]−M(2M + 1)2[2b(M + 1)− 1]
(2M + 1)[4pM(M − 1) + (2M + 1)] ,
t′0 = tM +
1
2M + 1
.
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Plugging tM and t
′
0 into (.11) and replacing M with (N − 1)/2, we can derive the following
from each inequality:
b <
N2 − p(N − 1)(N + 1)
N(N − 1)[p(N2 − 7N + 8) + 2N ] ,
b ≥ N
2(N − 2)− p(N − 1)(2N2 − 3N − 1)
N(N − 1)(N + 1)[N(1− p) + p] ,
b ≤ N(N
2 − 2N + 2)− p(N − 1)(2N2 − 5N + 5)
N(N − 1)(N + 1)[N(1− p) + p] ,
bN [p(N − 1)(N2 − 5N + 10)− 4N ] < p(N − 1)(3N − 5)−N(N − 2).
Thus, when the above four inequalities are satisfied simultaneously, the N -step equilibrium
exists in which mU = mN+1
2
. Given p and N , the supremum, b¯NN+1
2
(p), of b that satisfies all
the above inequalities is greater than b¯NCS = 1/[2N(N − 1)] if
N = 5 and
1
4
< p ≤ 35
54
; or
N ≥ 7 and N(N − 2)(N
2 − 4N − 1)
(N − 1)(2N3 − 10N2 + 9N + 5) < p ≤
N(2N − 3)
4N2 − 11N + 9 .
For an even number N ≥ 4, we can prove it similarly by constructing an equilibrium in
which mU = mN
2
+1. We omit the proof.
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